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ABSTRACT—Litigation against the Trump Administration has proliferated
rapidly since the inauguration. As cases challenging executive actions, such
as the “travel ban,” multiply in federal courts around the country, an
important procedural question has so far not been considered—Should
these sets of cases be consolidated in a single court under the Multidistrict
Litigation Act? Multidistrict litigation, or MDL, has become one of the
most prominent parts of federal litigation and offers substantial benefits by
coordinating litigation pending in geographically dispersed federal courts.
Arguably, those benefits would also accrue if “public law” cases were
given MDL treatment. There also are some underappreciated strategic
reasons why both plaintiffs and the government might want to invoke the
MDL process in these cases—and we suspect that, sooner rather than later,
one of these parties might give MDL a try.
In this Essay, we argue that although the MDL statute would allow for
consolidation of these public law cases, there are prudential reasons why
the judges in charge of MDL should stay their hands. In our view, these
cases rarely achieve the efficiencies of most MDLs, and there is value to
these cases undergoing scrutiny in multiple trial and appellate courts before
they percolate upward to Supreme Court review. Moreover, consolidation
of these cases would raise the political profile of the MDL process and thus
might politicize the MDL itself as well as the selection of its judges. This
politicization could undermine MDL’s primary role in mass tort
litigation—and, indeed, it risks harming the national tort system more
generally.
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INTRODUCTION
While running for the presidency, Donald Trump campaigned on a
platform promising jobs to the American people.1 So far, however, perhaps
his biggest success on that score has been creating work for lawyers suing
him and his Administration.2 Lawsuits challenging the new President’s
actions have proliferated throughout the federal courts, including the highprofile suits contesting the “travel ban” Executive Order,3 contending that
the President’s business entanglements violate the Emoluments Clauses of
the Constitution,4 and asserting that his plan to punish so-called “sanctuary
cities” is unconstitutional.5
The travel ban litigation, in particular, has been notable for its speed
and multiplicity. Almost immediately after the ban was announced, lawyers

1
See, e.g., Alexander Burns et al., Donald Trump Vows to Create 25 Million Jobs Over Next
Decade, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/16/us/politics/donald-trumpeconomy-speech.html [https://perma.cc/SC5N-GEK5].
2
Representative Denny Heck also joked that the hiring of lawyers by members of the Trump
Administration was part of an “attorney full employment act.” See Julia Manchester, Dem: Trump Has
‘Incredible Emphasis on Jobs, Jobs, Jobs’—for Lawyers, THE HILL (June 16, 2017), http://thehill.com/
homenews/house/338180-dem-trump-has-incredibly-emphasis-on-jobs-jobs-jobs-for-lawyers
[https://perma.cc/4UPS-5ECS].
3
See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2080 (2017) (granting certiorari).
4
See, e.g., Complaint, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Trump, No. 1:17CV-00458, 2017 WL 277603 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2017); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; id. art. II
§ 1, cl. 7.
5
See Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017); City of Seattle v. Trump,
No. 17-497, 2017 WL 4700144 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 19, 2017).
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fanned out across the country both to aid affected individuals and to
challenge the order in multiple federal courts.6 What resulted was a panoply
of rulings and overlapping injunctions, followed by several appellate
decisions and, inevitably, cert. petitions and Supreme Court review.7 As
these cases wended their way through various federal courts around the
country, a question occurred to us, as procedure scholars—Why haven’t
these cases—and the other sets of cases challenging the Administration—
been made the subject of multidistrict litigation (MDL)? And, if they were,
would that be preferable to the free-for-all of the status quo?
The MDL statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, allows for consolidation of
pretrial proceedings in a single federal district of all cases sharing a
common question of fact. Any party to any of the allegedly related cases
may make a motion for consolidation.8 This motion triggers consideration
by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML, or the Panel), the
panel of seven federal judges that decides whether cases should be
consolidated into MDL and where the MDL should be assigned.9 The MDL
statute’s goal is to prevent duplication of similar litigation in multiple
federal courts across the country. The basic idea is that it is more efficient
to conduct pretrial proceedings in cases involving the same questions only
one time and before only one judge, rather than over and over again before
many.
For many years, the 1968 MDL statute was relatively little noticed,
even by most procedure scholars,10 but that is emphatically no longer the
case. Quite the opposite is true: MDL is now in the spotlight, if for no other
reason than the surprising statistic that MDL cases currently make up more
than one-third of the pending federal civil docket, an astonishing increase
over the last two decades.11 Over the last few years, it has become accepted
wisdom that virtually any tort controversy of national import will
inevitably become an MDL proceeding consolidated before a single judge.
6

See generally Litigation Documents & Resources Related to Trump Executive Order on
Immigration,
LAWFARE,
https://lawfareblog.com/litigation-documents-resources-related-trumpexecutive-order-immigration [https://perma.cc/2V5V-NS87] (listing all of the litigation brought against
Trump in different jurisdictions).
7
Id.
8
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
9
See
Overview
of
Panel,
U.S.
JUD.
PANEL
ON
MULTIDISTRICT
LITIG.,
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/overview-panel-0 [https://perma.cc/4W6M-N8VN].
10
See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute
Resolution, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 552 (2013) (describing MDL as a “disfavored judicial backwater”
until the 2000s); Judith Resnik, From Cases to Litigation, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 47 (1991)
(describing MDL as a “‘sleeper’—having enormous effect on the world of contemporary litigation but
attracting relatively few critical comments”).
11
See infra Part I.
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Examples include the BP oil spill, the Volkswagen “clean diesel” fraud,
and the NFL concussion litigation, all of which were “MDL-ed” and
assigned by the JPML to handpicked judges in New Orleans, San
Francisco, and Philadelphia, respectively.12 And all have been resolved
relatively successfully through massive settlements, though not without
hiccups. In short, MDL is now a central and mostly well-regarded aspect of
the federal legal system when it comes to litigation of national scope,
largely because it facilitates a unitary, nationwide proceeding and,
potentially, a global settlement.
While it is true that MDL is best known for consolidating mass torts, it
is not confined to those cases. The small group of judges who developed
the MDL statute wanted it to be as open-ended as possible, so that its
application would not be limited to particular subject matters.13 As a result,
there is no language in the statute preventing the MDL device from being
deployed in what we might think of as “public law” cases,14 such as those
pending against the Trump Administration. There also are some good
reasons why participants in these cases—and the judges hearing them—
might find MDL attractive. For one thing, the same sort of efficiencies that
motivate a typical MDL may exist in public law cases—Why litigate the
same question, take the same discovery, and file the same briefs multiple
times when one will do, particularly in cases that are destined for Supreme
Court review? Although MDL is best known as a mass tort mechanism, it
is not difficult to imagine how its benefits might translate to public law
cases.
Moreover, parties on either side of the “v” might see MDL as a way
out of a courtroom they find unfriendly. That is, should a lawyer not be
satisfied with the luck of the draw in any particular district, she might roll
the dice with the JPML in hopes of getting a preferable judicial assignment.
The possibility of getting a more favorable draw from the JPML may be
especially tempting for plaintiffs if they expect, rightly or wrongly, that
they will get more favorable treatment from a JPML dominated, six to one,
by Clinton appointees.

12
See In re Oil Spill, Gulf of Mex., on April 20, 2010, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2010); In re
Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Litig., 148 F. Supp. 3d 1367 (J.P.M.L. 2015); In re Nat’l Football League,
842 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2012).
13
See Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165 U.
PA. L. REV. 831, 869 (2017) (noting that in March 1964, the drafters began “in earnest to develop a
proposal intended to apply broadly to all litigation pending in multiple districts, including ‘contract,
fraud, negligence, antitrust, and civil rights’”).
14
See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976).
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Given the opportunities that MDL consolidation offers, we expect that
it will not be long before some party dissatisfied with a random judicial
assignment will take a crack at MDL consolidation in a public law case. In
this Essay, we hope to provide some perspective about whether such
consolidation is consistent with the purposes of the MDL statute, preferable
as a matter of procedural policy, and desirable as a matter of procedural
politics. In other words—May these cases be sent to MDL, and, if so,
should they be?
In brief, we argue that, while MDL treatment of these cases would be
permissible under the terms of the statute, the JPML should usually avoid
consolidation of public law cases for two sets of reasons. First, we think the
traditional arguments for consolidation based on efficiency and consistency
are weakened in these cases and, to the contrary, there is some benefit to
percolation of these issues in multiple district courts. Moreover, in most of
these cases, the major disputes likely involve questions of statutory and
constitutional interpretation to be resolved on motions for preliminary
injunction or motions to dismiss, not after lengthy discovery or after trials
to resolve disputes of material fact. As a result, in these cases, one of the
primary benefits of MDL—the ability to minimize expensive, timeconsuming, and potentially duplicative discovery—is less important.
The second reason to avoid use of MDL in the public law context is
that there is real danger in politicizing the panel by involving it in these
sorts of cases. Introducing litigation like the travel ban cases would enmesh
the JPML in selecting the judge who will write the district court opinion
resolving the matter, likely on a motion for preliminary injunction. That
assignment decision will be both fraught and well publicized, and it may
risk the credibility of the panel in all of its judicial assignments. Moreover,
this new role may create an incentive for the Chief Justice, who has
unfettered statutory discretion to appoint the members of the JPML, to
stack the committee with philosophical fellow travelers—an allegation that
has been leveled against the Chief Justice’s more politically noteworthy
assignments.15
In this Essay, we will first briefly introduce MDL, where it came
from, and how it works. We will then discuss why it might appear to be an
appealing option in public law litigation. After giving those potential
benefits serious consideration, we then turn to explaining why in most
cases we believe that the JPML should presumptively refuse to consolidate
these cases, on the ground that the risks outweigh the benefits.

15

See infra Section III.B.
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I.

MDL BACKGROUND

For a long time, multidistrict litigation flew under the radar. It was
perceived as a wonkish, technical procedural device designed to coordinate
discovery in related cases.16 All that has changed: MDL has gone from bit
part in the federal litigation scheme to a starring role, at least in the context
of mass torts.17
In order to understand MDL’s current prominence, it is necessary to
understand the statute’s origins and the power it grants to the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation and transferee judges. Although its roots go back
even further, the proximate progenitor of the MDL statute was the massive
civil antitrust litigation that arose from revelations of price-fixing in the
electrical-equipment industry.18 That scandal—unprecedented in its size
and scope—threatened to overwhelm the federal courts with thousands of
complex and resource-consuming cases.19 In an attempt to mitigate the
threat posed by the deluge of litigation, Chief Justice Earl Warren created a
Judicial Conference committee called the Coordinating Committee on
Multiple Litigation. The Committee, initially chaired by Chief Judge Alfred
P. Murrah of the Tenth Circuit, was composed of nine federal judges, all of
whom were assigned at least one of the electrical-equipment cases and who
had previously demonstrated their enthusiasm for the then-novel but
burgeoning concept of judicial management.20
The Coordinating Committee had no formal power, but its goal was to
encourage cooperation between the federal judges and parties to the
litigation scattered around the country. Perhaps because of the scale of the
nationwide litigation, there was almost complete cooperation by all
involved.21 Ultimately, the Committee’s efforts were remarkably
16

See Bradt, supra note 13, at 832 (calling MDL a “second banana” to class actions).
Thomas Metzloff, The MDL Vortex Revisited, 99 JUDICATURE 36, 40 (2015) (explaining that
MDL is “in fact dominated by mass tort cases at a remarkable level”); William B. Rubenstein,
Procedure and Society: An Essay for Steve Yeazell, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 136, 144 n.40 (2013)
(“In the wake of Amchem and Ortiz, however, MDLs have become the form for resolution of mass tort
matters.”).
18
See Bradt, supra note 13, at 838.
19
See, e.g., The Impact of the Electrical Anti-Trust Cases Upon Federal Civil Procedure, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT OF THE UNITED STATES, 39 F.R.D. 375, 515 (1965) (statement of Judge Thomas Clary)
(describing the nationwide civil antitrust actions as an “avalanche”).
20
See Bradt, supra note 13, at 852–53, 860–61.
21
Among other innovations, the Coordinating Committee made use of nationwide conferences and
depositions, uniform national pretrial orders, and national document depositories to streamline pretrial
proceedings. See Phil C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel
Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A. J. 621 (1964); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 6 (1969) (“If it had not been for the monumental effort of the nine judges on this
17
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successful: although at least some of the defendants felt railroaded to
settlement by the pace of the litigation, it succeeded in its efforts to resolve
the entirety of the litigation quickly.22
The legacy of the Coordinating Committee goes beyond the electricalequipment suits. While those cases were ongoing, the Committee—with the
backing of Chief Justice Warren and the Judicial Conference—turned its
attention to creating a permanent mechanism for consolidating litigation
pending in multiple districts around the country. The two primary drafters
of the statute, Coordinating Committee member Judge William H. Becker
and reporter Phil C. Neal of the University of Chicago Law School, had the
insight that the kind of cooperation exhibited in the electrical-equipment
cases would be unlikely to recur, in large part because of defendants’
dissatisfaction with aggregated proceedings and federal judges’ chafing
under the control exercised by the Committee. As a result, in cases of
national import, the power of the federal courts needed to be centralized in
the hands of a single judge, and preferably one committed to the principles
of active case management.23 Indeed, as Judge Becker memorably put it, a
single judge must be in control of the pace of discovery and other pretrial
proceedings, or else the “litigants would run cases.”24 The ultimate result of
Neal and Becker’s efforts, the details of which are chronicled elsewhere,
was the MDL statute, passed by Congress without a single dissenting vote
in 1968.25
The statute itself is relatively barebones. It provides that “[w]hen civil
actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in
different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings” by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, a panel of seven federal judges selected by the
Chief Justice.26 The statute provides that consolidation should be “for the
convenience of parties and witnesses” and “promote the just and efficient
conduct of such actions.”27 Either the JPML on its own motion or any party

Committee of the Judicial Conference and the remarkable cooperation of the 35 district judges before
whom these cases were pending, the district court calendars throughout the country could well have
broken down.” (quoting Earl Warren, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Address to the Annual
Meeting of the American Law Institute (May 16, 1967))).
22
See CHARLES A. BANE, THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CONSPIRACIES: THE TREBLE DAMAGE
ACTIONS 379 (1973) (noting that “practically all of the remaining pending cases had been disposed of”
by the end of 1966); Bradt, supra note 13, at 860–63.
23
See Bradt, supra note 13, at 865–66.
24
Id. at 878.
25
Id. at 906.
26
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
27
Id.
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in any pending case may move for consolidation.28 Decisions about whether
cases will be consolidated, and where they will be transferred, are to be
made by the JPML.29 At the conclusion of pretrial proceedings, the cases
are to be remanded to the districts where they were filed for trial.30
There are almost no real limits on the JPML’s discretion when it
comes to the all-important conclusions about whether cases should be
consolidated into an MDL and to whom the MDL will be assigned. For one
thing, the statute applies anytime there are civil actions involving a
common question of fact pending in multiple districts—there is no
limitation as to subject matter.31 This was important to the drafters of the
statute, who perceived a coming “litigation explosion” arising out of new
technology, population growth, and expanded rights of action.32 Traditional
limitations on venue and personal jurisdiction also have been thought not to
apply to MDL.33 The only real barrier to the MDL’s selection of a
transferee judge is that both the proposed MDL judge and the chief judge
of her district must consent to the assignment.34 But none of these
limitations on the JPML’s discretion are practically enforceable because the
statute provides that review of an order of the panel may be had only by

28

Id. § 1407(c).
Id. § 1407(a). Federal district courts have their own procedures for consolidating related cases
within the district.
30
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40 (1998) (citing
Multidistrict Litigation: Hearings on S. 3815 and S. 159 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 110 (1967) (statement
of Sen. Joseph Tydings)).
31
The statute’s drafters were careful to keep the scope of consolidated actions broad, including, in
the vision of one of the statute’s backers, “air crash multiple litigation, several aspects of antitrust
litigation, patent and trade-mark multiple litigation, products liability multiple litigation, litigation
relating to corporate management, securities and stock brokerage fields and potential multi-litigation in
the fields of water and air pollution.” JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, SEPTEMBER 21–22, 1967, at 86
(1967); see also Bradt, supra note 13, at 869.
32
Judicial Administration: Hearing Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong. 26–27 (1966) (statement of C.J. William H. Becker, Western District of Missouri) (“We feel that
there is a litigation explosion occurring in the Federal courts along with the population explosion and
the technological revolution; that even with the addition of many new judges, the caseload, the backlog
of cases pending, is growing; and that some new tools are needed by the judges in order to process the
litigation . . . .”).
33
In re FMC Corp. Patent Litig., 422 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (J.P.M.L. 1976) (“[T]ransfers under
Section 1407 are simply not encumbered by considerations of in personam jurisdiction and venue.”).
34
28 U.S.C. § 1407(b).
29
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extraordinary writ.35 In the first fifty years of the JPML’s existence, such a
writ has never been granted.36
Moreover, the seemingly important limit of MDLs to “pretrial
proceedings” has proved illusory—or, at least, overstated. It is true that,
under the statute, “[e]ach action so transferred shall be remanded by the
panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district
from which it was transferred.”37 But that command comes with an
important condition: “unless it shall have been previously terminated.”38
Previously terminated cases include those decided on dispositive motion or
settled. Most readers will no doubt be familiar with the vanishing trial in
American civil litigation, whereby barely any civil cases make it all the
way to trial, instead ending after summary judgment or settlement.39 That
same trend extends to MDL. Virtually all consolidated cases are resolved in
the MDL district without any substantive contribution from the originating
courts.40 As a result, many MDL decisions are insulated from both appellate
review and review by other district judges.
Although the MDL statute has not changed since it was passed fifty
years ago, its prominence has expanded rapidly during the last fifteen
years.41 Now with nearly 40% of the pending federal civil cases as part of
an MDL,42 the MDL process is impossible to ignore.43 Today, it is nearly a

35

Id. § 1407(e). The JPML’s decision not to consolidate cases is not subject to appellate review.
Paul M. Janicke, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation: Now A Strengthened Traffic Cop
for Patent Venue, 32 REV. LITIG. 497, 512 (2013). More generally, it is fair to say that the MDL system
is in large respect insulated from both appellate review and the meddling of rulemakers, as are MDL
judges who have wide discretion to manage cases to resolution. See Andrew D. Bradt, The Stickiness of
the MDL Statute, REV. LITIG. (forthcoming 2018).
37
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a); see also Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S.
26, 35 (1998).
38
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
39
See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).
40
The Administrative Office of U.S. Courts reported the following about MDL cases:
Since its creation in 1968, the Panel has centralized 593,711 civil actions for pretrial proceedings.
By the end of fiscal year 2016, a total of 16,221 actions had been remanded for trial, 398 actions
had been reassigned within the transferee districts, 440,174 actions had been terminated in the
transferee courts, and 136,918 actions were pending throughout 55 transferee district courts.
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation—Judicial Business 2016, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-panel-multidistrict-litigation-judicial-business-2016
[https://perma.cc/93DL-LZWG]. And the trend, it seems, is toward even fewer trials. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 LA. L. REV. 399, 400–01 (2014).
41
See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67, 72
(2017) (noting that “from 2002 to 2015, multidistrict proceedings leapt from sixteen to thirty-nine
percent of the federal courts’ entire civil caseload”).
42
Emery G. Lee III et al., Multidistrict Centralization: An Empirical Examination, 12 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 211, 221–22 (2015) (describing statistical increase in MDL cases).
36
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foregone conclusion that mass tort litigation will be considered for MDL
treatment,44 and indeed the major tort controversies of recent years have
found themselves in front of MDL judges.45 And to the extent that we limit
ourselves to the goals of the statute’s drafters—centralized control over
dispersed litigation—MDL has been a massive success because it creates
ideal conditions for resolution: a single decisionmaker who can gather all
involved parties in a single courtroom.46
II. MDL’S PUBLIC LAW PUZZLE
Given its open-ended mandate, MDL is a conceivable vehicle for
public law cases that share a common question of fact. On rare occasion, a
public law-like case has reached the JPML. The panel consolidated some
9/11-related litigation,47 the BP oil spill Cases,48 various suits against
telecommunications providers that allegedly participated in NSA
surveillance,49 and the occasional administrative law dispute.50 But these
43
What explains MDL’s emergence? Most scholars peg the recent growth of MDL to the decline in
availability of the mass tort class action. See, e.g., Margaret S. Thomas, Morphing Case Boundaries in
Multidistrict Litigation Settlements, 63 EMORY L.J. 1339, 1346 (2014) (“As reliance on Rule 23
diminished, MDL has ascended as the most important federal procedural device to aggregate (and
settle) mass torts.”).
44
Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations:
Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 798 (2011) (noting the “massive
increase in MDL aggregate litigation”).
45
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
46
Admittedly, MDL has generated its own set of controversies, but on its own terms, it is a
success. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE 155
(2015) (describing the MDL statute as “[t]he most successful step in the administration of aggregate
litigation in the United States”).
47
See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001 (Asat Trust Reg., et al.), 714 F.3d 659 (2d Cir.
2013); In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 (Saudi Joint Relief Committee, et al.), 714 F.3d
109 (2d Cir. 2013); In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1377 (J.P.M.L.
2003).
48
See In re Oil Spill, Gulf of Mex., on April 20, 2010, 731 F. Supp.2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2010). See
generally MDL - 2179 Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” U.S. DISTRICT CT., EASTERN
DISTRICT OF LA., http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/OilSpill.htm [https://perma.cc/LW5W-WEKR]
(collecting relevant court documents).
49
See In re NSA Telecomms. Records Litig., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (J.P.M.L. 2006). These cases
were separate from overlapping suits against government officials. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l
USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013). Note also that the MDL cases were resolved not with the transferee judge
issuing (or denying) nationwide relief but with Congress stamping out the litigation entirely. See FISA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 201, 122 Stat. 2436, 2468–70 (2008) (codified at
50 U.S.C. § 1885(a) (2012)); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 539 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
50
In re Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litig., 716 F.Supp.2d 1369 (J.P.M.L. 2010)
(consolidating lawsuits under the Endangered Species Act seeking to require the government to list
certain specifies as threatened or endangered); In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and
§ 4(d) Rule Litig., 588 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2008) (consolidating Administrative
Procedures Act cases regarding endangered species). The Panel has also denied consolidation in some
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examples are not the prototypical public law cases that we address in this
Essay.51 Perhaps more importantly, these cases are outliers—they are the
best examples we could find among the 2,782 MDLs that have been created
during the fifty-year lifetime of the statute. Instead, the list of MDLs is
dominated by classic private law claims: products liability, mass torts,
antitrust, commercial law, and consumer law.52 As if to make our point, the
government has sought consolidation of FOIA litigation related to the
travel ban but not for the travel ban litigation itself.53 To be sure, the line
between “public” and “private” law cases is blurry; MDLs involving
private law claims against private defendants have intensely public
consequences. Cases in these areas—and particularly ones involving a
nationwide set of litigants—may be of national importance. Nevertheless,
there is a difference between these cases, which typically involve tort
claims against corporate defendants, and challenges to federal government
action, which have not been consolidated.
There have been plausible candidates for MDL among recent public
law cases. During the Obama Administration, the Supreme Court
entertained public law litigation with national consequences involving
issues from immigration (deferred action)54 to marriage equality (DOMA)55
administrative law cases. See In re Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,”
140 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1341 (J.P.M.L. 2015) (denying consolidation of related suits challenging EPA
rule); In re Removal From U.S. Marine Corps Reserve Active Status List Litig., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1350,
1351 (J.P.M.L. 2011) (denying consolidation of Administrative Procedure Act cases). The Panel denied
a series of MDL requests in IRS subpoena cases as well. See, e.g., In re Cybil Fisher Litig., 987 F.
Supp. 2d 1376, 1376 (J.P.M.L. 2013).
51
The 9/11 litigation and the BP case involved major issues of national concern, but they lacked
the classically public law character in their claims or proposed remedies. See Samuel Issacharoff & D.
Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397,
401 (2014) (noting that the BP Oil Spill’s “mass harms take on the quality of public law litigation, even
if played out in thousands of claims for private recompense” (footnote omitted)). Although the
Endangered Species Act cases sought declaratory and injunctive relief against a government agency in
an area of public law, they lack the je ne sais quoi of the cases at issue in this Essay.
52
The current totals are: Air Disaster: 3; Antitrust: 51; Common Disaster: 3; Contract: 6;
Employment: 4; IP: 10; Miscellaneous: 39; Products Liability: 72; Sales Practices: 30; and Securities:
15. See MDL Statistic Reports—Docket Type Summary, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG.
(Apr. 17, 2017), http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Dockets_By_TypeApril-17-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK42-A56X]. Almost all of the miscellaneous MDLs involve
consumer and/or privacy litigation. Id.
53
See In re American Civil Liberties Union Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Requests
Regarding Executive Order 13769, 2017 WL 3296361 at 1–2 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 2, 2017) (denying
consolidation).
54
See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016), affirming by an equally divided Court,
809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015). Texas was not the only challenge to deferred action. See, e.g., Arpaio v.
Obama, 797 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
55
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). Windsor was not the only case challenging
DOMA at that time. See, e.g., Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 724 F.3d 1048, 1049 (9th Cir.
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to healthcare (ACA)56—all of which had been litigated in multiple district
courts.57 In the first few months of the Trump Administration, we have seen
parallel litigation on immigration58 and environmental policy,59 and all signs
suggest that the federal courts will remain centers of public law activity for
the foreseeable future.60
In all of these cases, multiple suits had the capacity to raise
overlapping questions of fact, and convenience and justice may have
justified their consolidation.61 For a clear illustration, observe that many
recent national public law disputes have turned on intent or animus—
classic questions of fact for which one resolution might be more convenient
than many.62 In short, therefore, § 1407 could have been satisfied.63 And
yet, the JPML did not (at least formally) even consider consolidation in
these cases. Commentators, too, seemed uninterested in consolidation.
Prior to the motion to consolidate the travel ban/FOIA cases,64 a search in
2013); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Services, 682 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2012)
(resolving two cases); Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgm’t, 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 298 (D. Conn. 2012).
56
See, e.g., Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2751 (2014) (both Supreme Court cases involving consolidated MDL).
57
See supra notes 53–55. For an example of an issue that has not reached the Supreme Court,
consider the multiple courts addressing the Department of Education’s “Dear Colleague” letter as it
relates to restroom access. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810 (N.D. Tex. 2016);
Students v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-cv-4145, 2016 WL 6134121 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
58
See, e.g., Litigation Documents & Resources Related to Trump Executive Order on Immigration,
supra note 6 (collecting documents from more than fifty cases).
59
See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, California v. Zinke, No. CV-17-42GF-BMM, 2017 WL 1862941 (D. Mont. May 9, 2017); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, Citizens for Clean Energy v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 4:17-cv-00030-BMM, 2017 WL
1173696 (D. Mont. Mar. 29, 2017).
60
See, e.g., Tina Nguyen, The Swamp Fights Back: Donald Trump Is Fueling an Explosion of New
Lawsuits, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/03/donald-trump-newlawsuits [https://perma.cc/B2FG-UCFY]; After 2 Weeks in Office, Trump Faces More Than 50
Lawsuits, NPR (Feb. 2, 2017, 4:34 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/02/02/513045408/after-2-weeks-inoffice-trump-faces-more-than-50-lawsuits [https://perma.cc/2QJ5-TQSU].
61
See supra notes 55–59 (collecting cases). Many of these cases sound in the debates about
nationwide injunctions. See generally Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National
Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417 (2017).
62
See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 558–59 (2017);
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013); Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–
35 (1973); see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr. Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent,
130 HARV. L. REV. 523, 554–58 (2016) (discussing legislative intent in constitutional cases); Katherine
Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L. REV. 71 (2017)
(discussing evidence of presidential intent).
63
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
64
Specifically, this search was conducted on May 18, 2017, prior to the media attention on a
proposed MDL in travel ban-related FOIA litigation. See In re American Civil Liberties Union Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) Requests Regarding Executive Order 13769, No. 2786, 2017 WL 3296361,
at *1–2 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 2, 2017).
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Westlaw’s law review and all-news databases revealed zero relevant results
for “multidistrict” or “MDL” within the same sentence as immigration,
“Dream Act,” “deferred action,” DACA, DAPA, DOMA, “gay marriage,”
“marriage equality,” “Affordable Care Act,” “Obamacare,” “executive
order,” “Travel Ban,” “Muslim ban,” or “Trump.”65
This lack of interest is all the more puzzling because MDL would
seem to have been in the interest of the some of the players in these cases.66
Most obviously, MDL seems like it would have been in the interest of the
government defendants. For the federal government, MDL appears to solve
two key problems: a multiple-plaintiff problem67 and a forum-shopping
problem.68 First, the government might turn to MDL because it believes
that it has a better chance of success arguing before a single judge rather
than many. Consider the travel ban litigation. When these cases were being
litigated in district courts, the problem for the government was that, in
order for the ban to remain in place, it needed to win every single case
challenging the ban. From the plaintiffs’ perspective, if even one suit
succeeded in obtaining a preliminary injunction, the ban would be halted
nationwide.69 But had all of the cases been consolidated in a single MDL
proceeding, then the government would have needed to win only once to
avoid a preliminary injunction. Indeed, the Administration was successful
before Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton in Massachusetts.70 If he had been the
MDL judge, the government would not have had to continue litigating
other district court cases around the country.

65

Technically, there were two potentially relevant results. One was a blog post we wrote
previewing this article. Andrew Bradt & Zachary Clopton, MDL v. Trump, DORF ON LAW (Feb. 13,
2017), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/02/mdl-v-trump.html [https://perma.cc/5NLC-83GY]. The other
was a discussion of litigation against Donald Trump and others arising from the failed Taj Mahal
Casino. See In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993).
66
Recall that the JPML may consider consolidation upon the motion of any party in any action
proposed for consolidation, or upon the JPML’s own initiative. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c).
67
The challenge resonates with the “multiple-claimant anomaly” in the law of preclusion. See
generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4465.3 (2d ed. 1987); Brainerd Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25
(1965); Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L.
REV. 281 (1957). Though the government is not subject to offensive nonmutual issue preclusion, United
States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984), the availability of nationwide injunctions replicates this
anomaly.
68
See, e.g., Atlantic Star, [1974] AC 436 (HL) 471 (Eng.) (“‘Forum shopping’ is a dirty word; but
it is only a pejorative way of saying that, if you offer a plaintiff a choice of jurisdictions, he will
naturally choose the one in which he thinks his case can be most favourably presented: this should be a
matter neither for surprise nor for indignation.”).
69
See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing multiple-claimant anomaly).
70
Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F.3d 26, 38 (D. Mass. 2017).
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The second reason the government might turn to MDL is as a tool to
fight forum shopping. Many people have been critical of the recent spate of
nationwide injunctions allowing plaintiffs to forum shop for courts likely to
issue judgments in their favor that apply nationwide.71 In Samuel Bray’s
excellent treatment of these injunctions, he collected numerous such
injunctions issued against the Obama Administration from federal courts in
Texas and against the George W. Bush Administration from federal courts
in California.72 Although, in theory, the JPML could send the government
to an unfavorable district every time, it seems unlikely that the JPML
would be so uniformly plaintiff friendly—and even if it were, the
government would be left no worse off.
Plaintiffs also might see a strategic advantage in MDL. Recall that any
party to any action may request consolidation.73 If even one plaintiff in one
of these cases were unhappy with her draw of a district judge,74 she might
be intrigued by a JPML on which six of seven judges were appointed to the
bench by President Clinton.75 Such a plaintiff would hope that a friendly
JPML might pick and choose cases to send to friendly MDL judges. Even
if this would not be the interest of the entire collection of plaintiffs, it might
be sufficiently in the interest of a single plaintiff (or her lawyers) to
motivate a motion to consolidate.76
Yet another reason that either plaintiffs or defendants might be
interested in MDL is as a means to hasten Supreme Court review.
Sometimes the Supreme Court will wait to resolve an issue until there has

71

See, e.g., Bray, supra note 61, at 2. This problem is exacerbated by the long-standing practice of
according home-state senators a role in the selection of judicial nominees. See generally LEE EPSTEIN &
JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS (2005).
72
See Bray, supra note 61, at 8–10.
73
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
74
Even a plaintiff forum shopping for a favorable judicial district might be unhappy with the
particular judge within that district.
75
See Current and Former Panel Judges of the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/
Current_Former_Judges_of_the%20Panel-10-9-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AXV-N8AG].
76
See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (noting that the inquiry
into adequacy of representation “serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the
class they seek to represent”); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail”
Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1377 (2000) (noting
“the problem of ‘sweetheart’ settlements, in which the class members’ interests are compromised by
class counsel”). Plaintiffs’ lawyers also might use MDL to cut off other plaintiffs’ lawyers’ independent
management of their cases. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation,
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 80 (2015) (discussing attorney incentives in MDL).
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been an opportunity for percolation.77 Were a party interested in taking its
argument straight to the Supreme Court, it could use MDL as an
antipercolation device. In that situation, the Supreme Court could not delay
consideration of an important case on the grounds of percolation because
all potentially percolating cases would have been consolidated and resolved
in the MDL court.
Public law MDL also might pique judicial interests. It is possible that
one of the district judges hearing a major public law case might be inclined
to pass the hot potato,78 or that some of the JPML judges might be eager to
snatch these high-profile cases.79 Judges are people too, and thus they might
have preferences (in either direction) about their roles in high-profile cases.
Yet, they too have seemingly declined to propose MDL in public law-like
cases.
In short, parties and judges have had opportunities to request MDL in
public law cases—and they have had reasons to do so. Despite these
reasons, however, they have demurred. The explanation may be as a simple
as the parties’ risk aversion when it comes to rolling the dice with the
JPML.80 Or, there may be some path dependence—lawyers on both sides,
often repeat players, may simply intuit that public law MDL is not done
because it has not been done so far.81 Whatever the explanation, the public
law MDL has remained an anomaly.
Observing that multidistrict litigation has been available but unused in
major public law cases sounds like the set up for a pitch for more public
law MDL. Yet, as explained in the next part, there are sound reasons to
oppose any such expansion—and to implore the JPML to resist any such
temptation.

77
See SUP. CT. R. 10(a) (suggesting among the factors auguring in favor of certiorari would be that
“a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United
States court of appeals on the same important matter”).
78
Technically the transferor judge may not order JPML consideration sua sponte, but it would not
be hard for a motivated judge to gently suggest that a party should make such a motion.
79
28 U.S.C. § 1407(c)(i) (2012).
80
Plaintiffs may prefer a multitude of cases and are happy to take their chances by forum shopping
in districts where a majority of the judges seem amenable to their position; the government may prefer
the opportunity to litigate over and over again, immune to collateral estoppel in individual cases it loses.
81
This argument might be especially compelling because the types of lawyers familiar with MDL
(e.g., mass tort lawyers) are not usually involved in public law cases. Or, to put it another way, we
might be more likely to see a public law party invoke MDL when represented pro bono by one of these
MDL-familiar private lawyers.
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III. WHY THE JPML SHOULD USUALLY DECLINE TO CONSOLIDATE
PUBLIC LAW CASES
The previous Part explained that MDL is a plausible tool for public
law cases. This Part explains why we nevertheless oppose the use of that
tool. First, the kind of public law cases that may be candidates for MDL
would not benefit from the usual strengths of consolidated resolution:
reducing discovery costs, providing singular resolution, and facilitating
settlement. And any such consolidation deprives the federal courts of
potentially meaningful percolation. Second, despite superficial appeal,
MDL would not be an effective bulwark against forum shopping in these
cases. Indeed, any attempt to use MDL to check forum shopping may have
the dynamic effect of undercutting MDL as a tool for resolving complex
civil disputes.
A. Efficiency v. Percolation
One reason to be dubious of MDL in public law cases is that those
cases likely would not obtain the traditional efficiency benefits of
consolidation.
First of all, one major benefit of MDL is that it can reduce potentially
massive discovery costs in complex cases.82 A single judge overseeing
consolidated cases is in a better position to police duplicative discovery
requests than scores of judges hearing hundreds of separate cases. A single
judge also could resolve each of the many inevitable discovery disputes
only once—a major savings for court and lawyer resources. On the expert
side, Daubert motions, which are often very expensive and central to the
resolution of mass tort cases, can be centralized too.83
But while these issues are significant for complex civil cases, they are
not so pressing in public law litigation. In many public law cases, discovery
is minimal or nonexistent.84 Indeed, the fact that preliminary injunctions are
so central in these cases suggests that much of the legal work can be done

82
Civil discovery costs have been central to many of the important fights in civil procedure in the
last few decades. See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era? Federal Civil Procedure After the
2015 Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1, 44 (2016) (discussing discovery amendments to the Federal
Rules); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558–60 (2007) (discussing relationship between
pleading standards and discovery costs).
83
See, e.g., In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 524 F. Supp. 2d
1166, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Daubert motions in an MDL); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 593 F. Supp. 2d 549, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). See generally Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
84
Even questions of fact, such as intent, often may be resolved on the public record or thin
discovery. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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on a thin record.85 The travel ban cases provide an excellent example—
much of the crucial legal work was done at the preliminary injunction stage
without any fact discovery. Consolidating discovery, therefore, would be of
little use.
Second, MDL’s ability to facilitate global settlement is likely to be of
less utility in public law cases.86 If available, class action treatment may
allow parties to efficiently settle all related claims.87 But when class
treatment is unavailable—which is increasingly the case given the federal
courts’ hostility to Rule 2388—MDL is an important vehicle to make nonclass settlement less burdensome. The MDL judge can manage settlement
negotiations and play a highly important information-forcing role among
parties.89 Consider the yeoman’s work of the BP oil spill MDL, in which
hundreds of cases involving thousands of individual claims were settled
without the aid of a global class action.90
Here again, however, public law MDLs look different. Although
certainly public law cases may be voluntarily dismissed based on amicable
resolution, those resolutions do not look like private law settlements. The
issues in these cases are of public concern, and “settlement” would be the
result of a political process that seems like a poor candidate for
“managerial judging.”91 The problem in the travel ban cases, for example, is
not that the President has been unable to get in a room with representatives
of the various affected groups in order to demonstrate the art of the deal.
And any change in immigration policy is not likely to result from an MDL
judge ordering court-sponsored mediation or enlisting the services of a
high-profile special master92 but from political deal making or electoral
turnover.93

85

See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text (discussing nationwide injunctions). Moreover, to
the extent that some public law cases will turn on specific factual evidence—think, for example, proof
of the harm on different classes of citizens—that evidence will be case specific and thus not susceptible
to consolidation. And, again, even those costs likely will be low compared to complex private law
litigation.
86
See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in
Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1291 (2017) (describing how MDL is a “superb
vehicle for the development of information in modern mass-tort litigation”).
87
Id.
88
See Zachary D. Clopton, Class Actions and Executive Power, 92 NYU L. REV. 878, 880–84
(2017).
89
See Bradt & Rave, supra note 86, at 1259.
90
See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing BP).
91
See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
92
See, e.g., Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1038–41 (2016)
(discussing appointments of Ken Feinberg in BP, Robert Mueller in Volkswagen/clean diesel, and
others). For an unusual (and non-MDL) counterexample, see United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121,
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Finally (and relatedly), MDL may promote singular resolution by
resolving all cases on the merits94 or resolving important issues that can
lead to settlement.95 The idea of consolidating some public law cases is not
new—indeed, consolidated litigation for injunctive relief in civil rights
cases was the animating purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(2).96 Mandatory classes for injunctive relief not only offer the
efficiency benefits of consolidation, but they also insulate the government
from having to comply with potentially inconsistent obligations imposed by
different courts.97
However they are litigated, public law cases can produce singular
judgments too—but we might not be so eager to reach that result at the trial
court level and, potentially, even on a motion for a preliminary injunction.98
In cases like those addressed in this Essay, there may be systemic benefits
from multiple decisions by multiple judges arising from arguments by
multiple lawyers.99 Since cases of this magnitude are likely to wind up
before the Supreme Court,100 the quality of justice may improve with even a

123–25 (D.C. Cir. 1977), describing court-sponsored mediation of interbranch dispute over executive
privilege as it related to congressional subpoenas.
93
See, e.g., Maggie Haberman & Yamiche Alcindor, Pelosi and Schumer Say They Have Deal with
Trump
to
Replace
DACA,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
13,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/us/politics/trump-dinner-schumer-pelosi-daca-obamacare.html
[https://perma.cc/F8NF-PG6W].
94
See 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3866 (4th ed. 2017) (citing examples).
95
See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing Daubert).
96
See generally David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications
for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 702–08 (2011).
97
D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV.
1183, 1242–43 (2013) (describing the potential benefits of settlements in mandatory class actions for
injunctive relief).
98
While the existence of the Rule 23(b)(2) class action recognizes that a single answer in public
law litigation may be desirable, it does not preempt the question of whether MDL treatment is
appropriate in the cases we discuss—especially when many of these cases seek preliminary relief,
which could be accorded prior to decisions about class certification. Instead, the question becomes
whether MDL treatment of multiple (b)(2) class actions makes sense at the outset. For reasons
described here, we think not.
Moreover, we think it is significant that the standard for class certification is much higher than
the low bar for MDL consolidation. Arguments for a single resolution are stronger when there is
numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, and the government has acted on grounds applicable to
the class as a whole. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (b)(2). And, in contrast to MDL (as described in the next
Section), a decision by a single district judge to certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class does not pose any special
risk of politicizing the JPML or undermining the ability of the federal courts to resolve mass tort cases.
99
See, e.g., Burch, supra note 76, at 86 (discussing effects of appointing lead lawyers in MDL).
100
See, e.g., Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2080 (2017) (granting
certiorari).
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little bit of percolation in the lower courts.101 And even if the benefits of
percolation are weak, the countervailing costs to efficiency from foregoing
consolidation are not significant either.
B. Forum Shopping v. Judicial Politicization
Even if MDL does not provide the usual benefits when applied to
public law cases, we suggested above that the government might find MDL
attractive for a different reason: as a check on forum shopping.102 Lawsuits
against the federal government for matters of national policy often can be
litigated anywhere, and rational plaintiffs select districts that will give them
the best chances to succeed.103 Especially when the district judge may issue
relief with national or universal scope,104 the government should be wary of
a plaintiff’s handpicked district.
Although our earlier discussion was framed as a reason that the
government might be inclined to seek consolidation, the same arguments
may be relevant to the broader public policy question.105 Certainly, there is
disagreement about how much forum shopping should be permitted,106 but
we suspect that there is wide agreement that the U.S. legal system should
have some way to check unbridled court selection. In individual cases,
federal courts can cut back on plaintiff forum shopping in the interest of
justice with a horizontal venue transfer under § 1404(a).107 Perhaps MDL
101
See, e.g., Maryland v. Balt. Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950) (“It may be desirable to
have different aspects of an issue further illumined by the lower courts. Wise adjudication has its own
time for ripening.”); Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court’s
Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 719 (1984) (“A managerial conception of
the Court’s role embraces lower court percolation as an affirmative value. The views of the lower courts
on a particular legal issue provide the Supreme Court with a means of identifying significant rulings as
well as an experimental base and a set of doctrinal materials with which to fashion sound binding
law.”). But see, e.g., Paul Bator, What Is Wrong with the Supreme Court?, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 689
(1990) (“First, we must always remember that perpetuating uncertainty and instability during a process
of percolation exacts important and painful costs.”).
102
See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
103
Id.
104
Id.; see also Bray, supra note 61, at 8–10 (discussing these injunctions and collecting
examples).
105
In future work, we intend to explore more deeply the role of the MDL process in forum
shopping generally, and the significant power wielded by the JPML in this regard.
106
See, e.g., Pamela K. Bookman, The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum Shopping, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 583, 587 (2016) (highlighting “unappreciated virtues of global forum shopping” and
collecting sources arguing that forum shopping is “often a neutral practice”).
107
See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). See generally Edmund W. Kitch, Section 1404(a) of the Judicial
Code: In the Interest of Justice or Injustice?, 40 IND. L.J. 99 (1965). Removal achieves this effect
vertically, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (allowing removal from state to federal court), and forum non
conveniens is available intersystemically. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 261 (1981)
(granting forum non conveniens motion to dismiss in favor of litigation in Scotland).
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also can achieve an anti-forum-shopping function—much like § 1404(a),
the MDL statute gives the JPML the power to move cases based on
considerations of justice.108
Furthermore, using MDL to fight forum shopping rather than §
1404(a) might avoid some of the biases inherent in that latter procedure.109
By statute, § 1404(a) transfers are at the discretion of the potential
transferor judge.110 Presumably, some judges are disinclined to give away
high-profile cases,111 and as such they would be disinclined to grant §
1404(a) motions.112 This seems especially likely if the plaintiff is successful
in landing a politically friendly judge, who may be wary of transferring a
case to the less friendly district requested by defendant.113 Avoiding the
transferor-judge bias of § 1404(a), the MDL statute assigns the transfer
decision to the independent judgment of the JPML.114
In spite of these advantages to using MDL to limit forum shopping,
there are a number of reasons it may be a poor response in the public law
context. First, while § 1404(a) transfers typically identify the transferee
district,115 JPML orders typically identify the transferee judge.116 This
approach might make some sense when trying to identify a judge capable
of handling a truly complex piece of litigation117 or trying to build up a

108

See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (suggesting that consolidation should, among others, “promote the
just . . . conduct of such actions). Section 1407 consolidations are for pretrial purposes only, but
especially when a TRO or preliminary injunction is a significant goal, then pretrial purposes become
more prominent than the name suggests.
109
MDL also might be better at checking forum shopping because while § 1404(a) transfers are
limited to the districts where the case might have been brought, the JPML may transfer to “any district.”
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), with id. § 1407(a).
110
See § 1404(a).
111
One need not be a student of the “endowment effect” to recognize that judges might have an
attachment to cases before them. See Daniel Kahneman, et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment
Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1332–35 (1990) (summarizing studies).
112
Clermont and Eisenberg found that the success rate of § 1404(a) transfer motions was close to
(but less than) 50%. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of ForumShopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1529 (1995). Their study does not identify the baseline for the
right number of transfers, nor does it address high-profile cases in particular.
113
Of course, some judges might want to duck high-profile cases or they might have a “preference
for leisure,” either of which would result in an overuse of § 1404(a) transfers. See RICHARD A. POSNER,
HOW JUDGES THINK 36 (2008). Whatever the direction of the bias, in all cases transferor-judge bias will
be introduced.
114
It is also possible that the group decisionmaking of the Panel improves outcomes. See generally
JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004).
115
See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
116
Id. § 1407(b). See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 94, § 3864.
117
See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 94, § 3864 (citing examples).
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cadre of judges capable of doing so.118 But when it comes to high-profile,
public law cases, the selection of a transferee judge is necessarily fraught.
Every federal district judge was appointed to her seat by a president from
one party or the other. Every federal district judge has a record that may
trouble one or more parties.119 In other words, for the JPML, every choice
in these cases is one that might attract criticism, whether warranted or
not.120
Moreover, once the JPML is recognized as a powerful political agent,
there will be a temptation to use it politically. Empirical studies have
demonstrated that appointments to the JPML do not have a strong
ideological edge.121 Indeed, as of this writing, of the fifty judges to have
served on the JPML, exactly twenty-five were appointed to the bench by
Republican presidents and twenty-five by Democratic presidents.122 But one
could imagine Chief Justice John Roberts (or a future Chief Justice)
responding to an increasingly political JPML by appointing judges more
amenable to his own political philosophy. Indeed, the Chief has been
criticized on exactly this score for his selections for the Civil Rules

118
See, e.g., In re TD Bank, N.A., Debit Card Overdraft Fee Litig., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1378, 1379
(J.P.M.L. 2015); In re Lidoderm Antitrust Litig., 11 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1345–46 (J.P.M.L. 2014) (noting
that selection of transferee district allows assignment of case to a district that “has the necessary judicial
resources and expertise to efficiently manage this litigation.”).
119
An additional consideration may be governing law. In MDL cases, lower federal courts have
long held that, for federal question cases, the law of the transferee circuit applies to cases transferred
into the MDL. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F. 2d 1171, 1176 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (noting that law of transferor forums do not hold stare decisis). This practice stands in
contrast with state law cases under the diversity jurisdiction transferred to MDLs, in which the MDL
court must apply the law that the transferor court would have applied. See Andrew D. Bradt, The
Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice of Law in Multidistrict Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 759, 793 (2012). As a result, the selection of the MDL judge may include selection of the circuit
law that would apply both in the MDL court and on appeal. See Richard Marcus, Conflict Among
Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial System, 93 YALE L.J. 677 (1984). This, too, might
be a source of backlash.
120
Although our goal in the Essay is to discourage the use of MDL for public law cases, were the
JPML inclined to get involved, the foregoing analysis suggests a few potential options: (i) random
assignment, which is the JPML’s practice for a certain class of administrative law cases, see id.
§ 2112(a)(3)); (ii) assignment to a district (rather than a specific judge) with an instruction for that
district to use random assignment; or (iii) assignment to multiple judges, (see 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b)
(referring to “judge or judges to whom such actions are assigned”)).
121
See, e.g., Tracey E. George & Margaret S. Williams, Designing Judicial Institutions: Special
Federal Courts and the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (2013) (unpublished manuscript),
https://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/events/George.pdf [https://perma.cc/GWZ7-DFXL].
122
We provide a list of every member of the JPML and the party of the appointing president in the
Appendix. See Current and Former Panel Judges, U.S. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG.,
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Current_Former_Judges_of_the%20Panel-10-9-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RA79-4G9G]. Note too that every JMPL judge was appointed by a Chief Justice
appointed by a Republican president.
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Advisory Committee123 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.124
Even if the current JPML could act apolitically in these cases, it may be
only a matter of time before a new set of panel judges might break that
norm.125
The selection of judges for political reasons also might have spillover
effects for more traditional MDL cases. Currently, the JPML is made up of
judges who are well versed in managing complex private litigation. But if
the panel starts being involved in more controversial cases, a Chief Justice
might be inclined to consider ideological priorities in making appointments
that may not line up with efficient resolution of mass torts. This would be
an especially inauspicious outcome because, even if the government
routinely brought public law suits to the JPML, they would be substantially
outnumbered by the tens of thousands of private MDL cases each year.126
For those of us who think that the JPML has done a commendable job in
managing complex litigation, it would be a pity to see it give up that
expertise.127
Finally, not only might a political JPML attract the attention of the
Chief Justice, it also might attract the attention of Congress (or interested
parties lobbying Congress). MDL is already in the political crossfire over
aggregate litigation generally. For example, a recent House bill proposed
reining in some of the advantages plaintiffs are thought to have in MDL
proceedings.128 Again, it would be disappointing to lose the ability to

123
See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation
Reform: An Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559, 1571–76 (2015); Elizabeth Thornburg,
Cognitive Bias, the “Band of Experts,” and the Anti-Litigation Narrative, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 755,
765–66 (2016).
124
See, e.g., Maxwell Palmer, Does the Chief Justice Make Partisan Appointments to Special
Courts and Panels?, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 153, 153 (2016); Charlie Savage, Roberts’s Picks
Reshaping Secret Surveillance Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/
21/us/roberts-varies-pattern-in-choice-for-spy-court.html [https://perma.cc/82HM-SHDF]; Charlie
Savage, Newest Spy Court Pick Is a Democrat but Not a Liberal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/21/us/roberts-varies-pattern-in-choice-for-spy-court.html
[https://perma.cc/82HM-SHDF]. After those articles were written, two judges originally appointed by
President Clinton were added to the court. See Current Membership, U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE CT., http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/current-membership [https://perma.cc/NNL3UGBG].
125
The MDL statutes does not expressly authorize or prohibit the Chief Justice from removing
members of the panel, but at a minimum the Chief can fill any vacancies with as he sees fit. See
28 U.S.C. § 1407.
126
See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
127
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
128
Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2017,
H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017) (passed by House of Representatives on Mar. 9, 2017).
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consolidate tens of thousands of private law disputes because of a few
public law ones that did not really need consolidation in the first place.
CONCLUSION
There is nothing doctrinal or statutory standing in the way of MDL
treatment of the sorts of public law cases being brought against the Trump
Administration. And our suspicion is that, sooner or later, a party to one of
these cases is going to give it a shot by filing a motion for consolidation of
pretrial proceedings with the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. It
might be the government, which may prefer fighting on one front, rather
than all around the country. Or it might be a plaintiff, who might believe
that consolidated treatment will allow for economies of scale and provide
an opportunity to take the lead on the nationwide litigation. Even more
strategically, it might be a plaintiff or defendant who would rather take her
chances with a judicial assignment by the JPML than with the judge to
whom her case has been assigned.
But while the idea of efficiently consolidating public law cases might
be superficially attractive, we think it would be a mistake for the JPML to
wade into these cases and contrary to the statutory requirement that the use
of MDL “promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions.” Any such
move is unlikely to bring considerable benefits, and it risks politicizing the
Panel and undermining its core function. Instead, for the reasons described
in this Essay, we urge the JPML to consider the limited efficiency MDL
offers in public law cases as compared to its substantial risks, and we hope
that MDL remains primarily the province of mass torts—and our Civil
Procedure classroom hypotheticals.
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APPENDIX
JPML JUDGES APPOINTED

JPML JUDGES APPOINTED

BY DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTS

BY REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTS

Alfred P. Murrah
Edward Weinfeld
William H. Becker
Joseph S. Lord III
Stanley A. Weigel
Roy W. Harper
Charles R. Weiner
Edward S. Northrop
Fred Daugherty
Hugh S. Dillin
Milton Pollack

Robert Merhige, Jr.
Barefoot Sanders
Royal Furgeson, Jr.
Frank C. Damrell, Jr.
David G. Trager
Barbara S. Jones
Marjorie O. Rendell
Charles R. Breyer
Lewis A. Kaplan
Sarah S. Vance
Ellen Segal Huvelle

Louis H. Pollak

Catherine D. Perry

Halbert Woodward
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John Minor Wisdom
Edwin A. Robson
Andrew A. Caffrey
Murray J. Gurfein
Robert H. Schnacke
Sam C. Pointer
John F. Nangle
William B. Enright
Clarence A. Brimmer
John F. Grady
Louis C. Bechtle

Morey L. Sear
Bruce M. Selya
Julia Smith Gibbons
D. Lowell Jensen
J. Frederick Motz
Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Kathryn H. Vratil
David R. Hansen
Anthony J. Scirica
John G. Heyburn II
Paul J. Barbadoro

John F. Keenan

R. David Proctor

Wm. Terrell Hodges

